The Approaching Hour

Passing Thoughts On Iran And Its Nuclear Program

Soon from the sea a noxious birth began;
Forgotten lands with weedy spires of gold;
The ground was cleft, and mad auroras rolled
Down on the quaking citadels of man.
Then, crushing what he chanced to mould in play,
The idiot Chaos blew Earth’s dust away.¹

Rembrandt. Belshazzar’s Feast. c.1635-1638

Prologue: The Doomsday Clock and Iran’s Promise

The clock is ticking. The hour is growing ever nearer at hand. This is the promised hour of death and destruction when the stain will be finally washed away. A veritable doomsday comes for the enemy of the state. This, the Iranian leadership has promised its people. They have erected a monument in Tehran that counts down to this promised time, this approaching hour. A doomsday clock which is counting down the life of its hated Zionist foe. The clock is set based on the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s prediction that by 2040 there will be no State of Israel.²

Iran: A 2025 Geopolitical And Domestic Assessment

In contrast to this dire vision of the end, the geopolitical situation in 2025 is one where Israel appears to hold the upper hand. Iran’s quest for regional hegemony is in shatters. Hamas, which attacked the Jewish state on Oct. 7, 2023, is weakened, and there is fear on its part about the Trump plan for a post-war Gaza that would allow those stuck in the war zone to find shelter elsewhere.³ Some Gazans have already started to emigrate under this plan.⁴ Hezbollah is down (though not entirely out).⁵ Assadist Syria has fallen.⁶ Its game of directly striking Israel has so far ended in Israel achieving escalatory dominance. The United States, under a new administration since January, is now re-applying a strategy of maximum pressure⁷ against the Ayatollah’s regime and is pummeling the Houthis in Yemen.⁸ Though Russia and Iran have formalized a new agreement,⁹ it notably falls short of a military alliance.

Domestically, Iran is beset with serious problems. Power outages are becoming a common occurrence.¹⁰ The country, despite being awash in oil, is suffering energy problems. It has an ongoing water crisis.¹¹ The economy is in an abysmal state.¹² According to polls, the public thinks these domestic woes are exacerbated by the country’s foreign policy and prefers diplomatic engagement with Western powers.¹³ Most Iranians think the government does not listen to the demands of the youth and do not care about them.¹⁴ There has been a dramatic rise in Iranians favoring a separation of religion and state¹⁵—which runs counter to the regime’s core ideological structure. Protests wax and wane against the theocratic regime.¹⁶

All of this does not axiomatically mean that the regime’s demise is imminent. Let us not construct a doomsday clock of our own. This is merely to say that Iran finds itself in a frustrating geopolitical and internal lurch. In light of these series of problems, some senior officials within the regime have been vocal about rushing to obtain nuclear weapons.¹⁷ The power of the atom, they shout, will save us. It is the tempting shield of salvation from foreign intervention and an irradiated infernal sword for Iran to double down on its own interventions and quest for hegemony.

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Progress & Intent

Indeed, the state has for decades had a nuclear program of its own and has moved it far beyond any stage applicable to peaceful purposes. The country has already, as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard observed, “enriched [its] uranium stockpile… [which is now] at its highest levels,” a development she described as “unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons.”¹⁸ Iran further has reduced its breakout time to produce a bomb¹⁹ and has invested in (and achieved) delivery systems capable of carrying such bombs.²⁰

Yet, far from staving off the insecurity of the regime, such a rush, if actually attempted and detected early enough by Iran’s enemies, might lead toward the very dreaded armed foreign intervention it wanted to prevent. The Israelis certainly would not stand for a nuclear-armed Iran if they can prevent it. So, what now? Does the approaching hour signal grim-visaged war?

The Diplomacy Debate

The United States has opened a dialogue with Iran at this precarious juncture. President Donald Trump has stated that he prefers a diplomatic approach to resolve the Iranian nuclear question. He has, for the moment, reportedly waved away Israeli suggestions to directly strike the regime’s nuclear sites.²¹ At the same time, he has maintained pressure on the regime through the threat of intervention,²² lethal strikes against the Houthis, and the imposition of economic sanctions. The opening position²³ by his administration is that Iran must cease and dismantle its nuclear enrichment and weaponization programs. Israel, too, announced that it would be amenable to a nuclear deal with Iran—but only if stringent measures were imposed, based on the 2003 Libyan nuclear disarmament model.²⁴ Trump has reportedly given Tehran two months to come to an agreement.²⁵

This stance has been reiterated by the White House’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, although he had previously indicated a willingness to limit rather than eliminate their nuclear program.²⁶ The Iranians, unsurprisingly, publicly balked at this declaration. “The issue of enrichment is non-negotiable,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi proclaimed. He added that there were “contradictory and conflicting positions” aired by the administration on the issue and that the “true position” would be revealed during the course of negotiations.²⁷ We are then in a period of ambiguity—where neither grim visaged war nor the piping sound of peace are certain, but both are possible.

Despite the complexities, some suggest that a nuclear deal with Iran may not be as elusive as it seems. Analysts like Alexander Mercouris of The Duran, argue that the Iranians do not actually want nuclear weapons. As such, they believe there exists a zone of relatively easy agreement between the United States and Iran.²⁸ Supporters of this view can point toward Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa—a religious edict—that foreswore the production of nuclear weapons as un-Islamic.²⁹ They might also note the 2025 public ODNI assessment that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003.”³⁰ Furthermore, they may argue that a previous nuclear agreement had already been reached with Iran—this was one that Trump rudely left years ago.

There are cracks in this citadel of argumentation. For one thing, there is no evidence that this vaunted fatwa was ever written down.³¹ There are questions raised about whether this fatwa even exists.³² One could, however, counter that the aforementioned ODNI assessment lends credence to the idea that some kind of decision—be it a fatwa or otherwise—was made by the Supreme Leader in 2003 to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet, I think much of this discussion misses the forest for the trees. A fatwa—even if it exists—is not irreversible and can be changed at a whim based on the assessment of the religious leader. “Fatwa is changeable by nature and the Shia theology gives this freedom to be flexible and go for the most updated interpretation and circumstances,” Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute on Near East Policy said.³³ Perhaps, then, a more accurate reading of the ODNI statement would be that Iran has not, as of now, decided to pursue nuclear weapons breakout.

There is the further matter that Iran has pursued a nuclear program that goes well beyond any technical peaceful purpose. As the same ODNI assessment acknowledged:

Tehran will try to leverage its robust missile capability and expanded nuclear program, and its diplomatic outreach to regional states and U.S. rivals to bolster its regional influence and ensure regime survival.³⁴

If Iran did not want nuclear weapons, and was not actively pursuing them, why has it spent decades developing technology with applications far beyond peaceful uses? Why is it reducing breakout time for such an eventuality? Why invest so heavily in this project despite an economy marked by crumbling infrastructure? Why continue to violate agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it previously signed, committing to forsake such nuclearization? Generally speaking, those who undergo “the fatigue of labour, must solace” their “weariness with the contemplation of its reward.”³⁵ As the inestimable Johnson noted centuries ago, farmers do not turn up the earth without the thought of the harvest.³⁶ What then is the reward of Iran’s nuclear program that the country labors and suffers for it so? It is not by now peaceful nuclear power plants. Perhaps one might hazard another design.

To be sure, a negotiated settlement that effectively forecloses and dismantles Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities would be the preferable outcome. Ideally, this would be achieved through bloodless but hard diplomacy than bloody and expensive violence. However, the JCPOA—the nuclear deal with Iran done by President Barack Obama—failed to do this. Instead, it merely, through its sunset provisions, delayed the inevitable: Iran’s ability to reach nuclear breakout. The deal failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program, its principle nuclear weapons delivery system.³⁷

The entire Middle East—not just Israel—was scornful of the agreement and distrustful of the Iranians. Even before Trump left the deal, Iran was already in violation of it.³⁸ This was on top of Iran’s repeated, regular, and ongoing violations of its obligations under the already-cited NPT that it is party to.³⁹

Realism vs. Idealism in Negotiation

There is therefore much room to doubt The Duran’s confidence in that an easy agreement would finally resolve this long-standing issue. One of the parties, after all, was never supposed to advance its nuclear research beyond peaceful application in the first instance. It is all the more curious that Mr. Mercouris of The Duran questioned those who voiced skepticism and issued hostile rhetoric about Iran. “You [Mr. Kucinich] mentioned that making threats actually propels you towards conflict…if you start bringing in threats like that…at a very early stage in a negotiation then the entire negotiation will start to be framed around the threat rather than seeking the agreement you want to see achieved and that is a very dangerous thing,” he said.⁴⁰

In the rudimentary sense, yes, voicing threats does foster a sense of conflict. One may even grant that the overindulgence in threats around the negotiating table can be counterproductive in securing the desired deal. But on a basic level, all serious negotiations revolve around threats—be they economic or military, explicit or implicit. International politics in a realist sense is about power imbalance and how to leverage the threat of that (and on occasion its actuality) or combat that. Russia, for instance, insists in its peace talks with Ukraine that their adversary formally cede territory to them. Russia can do this because they employed force to alter the territory it controls and can threaten to continue or expand its use of force to annex more land. Pretending otherwise is to believe that negotiations rest on benevolent goodwill alone. All one needs to then do is sideline those brash and crude realists who annoyingly put out the obvious,⁴¹ and castigate those who soberly prepare for a more forceful option in event of failure. The magical force of one’s own thoughts of peace, such advocates may say, will produce peace. Such magical thinking is a recipe for delusion, derision, miscalculation, disaster, and even the very war that one wished to prevent.

Trump’s threat posture, therefore, reflects sober realism, not recklessness toward Iran. The striking of mighty blows by air to Iran’s allies creates an impetus for Iran to get to the table and hammer out the issue diplomatically. Even if the sweet desideratum of a deal that scraps the Iranian nuclear weapons program is obtained, the measure of the deal will be its implementation or lack thereof.⁴² At any rate, Mercouris perhaps should look into Iran’s own house before casting stones at the country’s skeptics by lecturing them about what threats propel conflict.

Ideology and Existential Hostility

Supreme Leader Khamenei has repeatedly called for the annihilation of Israel⁴³ and insists that “armed resistance” against the Jewish state “is the cure”⁴⁴ for the disease of its existence. He has vowed that Israel is not long for this world.⁴⁵ Iranian officials have repeatedly called Israel a “one bomb state.”⁴⁶ Iranian presidents have echoed their supreme leader’s call for the eradication of Israel. The Jewish state ought to be “wiped off the face of the earth” then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in 2005 as he addressed a conference titled “The World Without Zionism.”⁴⁷ Nor is this ideological opposition new to the Iranian regime. It existed from the onset of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It is displayed brazenly not just in the doomsday clock erected in Tehran, but every year on al-Quds Day where the regime sponsors a public rage against Israel ritual.⁴⁸ It would be folly if one thought that this blinding rage is directed at Israel alone. Chants of “Death to America” are heard alongside “Death to Israel” in this state-sponsored event.⁴⁹ According to state ideology, Israel is merely the “Little Satan” compared to the American “Great Satan.”⁵⁰ Iranian state education indoctrinates the youth with antisemitic textbooks calling for total and endless war with Israel as a means of salvation, the exportation of the Iranian Revolution across the Middle East, and hatred toward foreigners.⁵¹

Nor has such hateful content remained boarded up within Iran itself. It has spillover across the world. The Iranian sponsored gangs who attack not just Israelis but Jews generally across the world.⁵² It has resulted in Americans being held hostage in their own embassy in Iran and a lethal explosion to a U.S. Marine barracks.⁵³ While the current President of Iran has said that he would be willing to have good relations with all countries, he expressly excluded Israel from this list.⁵⁴ This path precludes recognition of Israel or direct diplomatic dealings, which in turn makes it more difficult for the Israelis to believe that the regime bears them anything but existential harm. By not coming to terms with the existence of Israel, this only allows the conflict to fester—whether a nuclear deal is reached or not—and contributes to greater regional instability.

Granted for Iran to recognize Israel, it would have to overcome the extensive ideological structure it has erected. This is no easy thing, despite the fact that a good portion of Iranian history has been relatively friendly to the Jews and their historic states in the Land of Israel. This history is rigorously erased by the regime. Granted, for The Duran and much of their audience— who hold many gripes with Israel—believe the core of Middle Eastern instability lies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁵⁵ I would disagree that it is the core of conflict in the Middle East but note that several Arab regimes have used it as an excuse for their own purposes. A greater commentary by myself on the matter would be the hypothetical subject of another essay entirely. Suffice it to say, other conflicts in the region that have nothing to do with Israel have caused greater death tolls and a higher wave of emigration. Historically, the region has been long riven with bloodstained rivalry be it the old Ottoman Empire and Persia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Assyria, Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Syria, and so on.

Israel’s Strategic Doctrine

The Israelis, for their part, have historically prevented other hostile states in the region acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine—the Begin doctrine—emerged when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq advanced such a program. Hussein named the two main nuclear reactors Tammuz 1 and 2.⁵⁶ The fact that King Nebuchadnezzar II of Babylon, whom Hussein identified with,⁵⁷ launched his fated siege of Jerusalem in the month of Tammuz—an assault that would culminate in the destruction of the city, the First Temple, and the Kingdom of Judah—did not escape the attention of the Israelis. At the time, much of the world — and especially the West — remained indifferent to the Iraqi dictator’s nuclear ambitions. Hussein further informed Iran, a country that he was then at war with, not to be worried about his nuclear project as it was not directed against them but against Israel.⁵⁸ Then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin elected, after first employing a variety of other measures, to bomb Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, which effectively knocked out Iraq’s nuclear program. The Israelis would do the same thing in 2007 to a suspected Syrian nuclear site.⁵⁹ In neither case did these strikes cause a direct shooting war with the targeted state.

It is therefore an oddity given this doctrine that a similar measure has so far not been taken by Israel against Iran. After all, much of the region has declared that if Iran acquires the bomb that they too will seek it⁶⁰ and we have already covered how the regime ideologically is opposed to the existence of Israel. This, though, can be somewhat explained in the fact that the Iranian nuclear program was more spread out and better fortified than either the suspected Syrian attempt or the Iraqi attempt to obtain nuclear weapons. This makes such an operation significantly more complicated. Israel has also, in part, delayed action at the request of the United States. American leaders have repeatedly assured them that Iran will not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons.⁶¹ Yet, the promise of a friend, may in the end, account for little. The North Koreans heard similar warnings from the United States —only to succeed in building a nuclear arsenal.⁶² The Israelis may therefore conclude, when push comes to shove, that unilateral action is safer than relying on allies.⁶³

The October 7, 2023 invasion of Israel and the massacres carried out by Hamas—an Iranian-funded, supplied, and trained terror organization—marked a turning point. Previously, they allowed Hezbollah to amass on their northern border and would only engage in very limited mowing-the-grass operations in Gaza⁶⁴ that aimed to degrade but not destroy Hamas. Israel invested and relied on its missile defense umbrella as a means of dealing with these threats. After October 7, however, Israel adopted a more assertive stance toward both its border threats and Iran itself. This shift has weakened Hezbollah and pushed it back from the border. Israel continues to aggressively punish violations of the ceasefire agreement by striking at remaining Hezbollah assets attempting to reconstitute themselves in southern Lebanon. One potential Iranian method of retaliation in the event of an Israeli strike has thus, for now, been (at least partly) neutralized. The fall of Assad also has removed Syrian air defenses and warning systems from the equation. The weakening in Iranian air defenses has also opened up a time frame favorable to an easier strike.

A Decision Point

Trump is obviously trying to use this threat of action in his posturing with Iran. The Iranian leadership does want to survive. To amend a phrase, it is good to be the Ayatollah. In my view at least, the question of whether they breakout with a bomb depends on whether they think they can get away with it. If they feel that in the process of obtaining the nuclear bomb, they risk their own toppling, they will not go for a breakout. Yet, the hour of decision regarding the nuclear program must come at some point. Should diplomacy fail to resolve the issue, then other more coercive means are likely to be employed. These acts could (though not necessarily will) lead toward a direct shooting war. The bells at the clocktower may toll, but it is not yet clear for whom or what they toll.

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1. Lovecraft, H.P. (2009). Fungi from Yuggoth. Originally published in 1943. https://www.hplovecraft.com/writings/texts/poetry/p289.aspx.

2. Times of Israel & Associated Press. (2021, July 7). Iran’s doomsday clock for Israel’s end halts amid power cuts. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-doomsday-clock-for-israels-end-halts-amid-power-cuts/;Times of Israel & Agencies (2017, June 23). Unveiling clock showing 8,411 days left for Israel, Iranians rage against Jewish state. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranians-parade-missiles-shout-death-to-israel-in-annual-rally/.

3. Said, S., Keller-Lynn, C., & Faucon, B. (2025, April 16). A Depleted Hamas Is So Low On Cash That It Can’t Pay Its Fighters. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-finances-fighters-payments-gaza-f98df760; Halabi, E. (2025, April 16). ‘Gaza is humiliated’: Anti-Hamas protests erupt again, call for end to war and terror. Ynet. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjm8ui60jg; Fox, A. (2025, April 2). The Middle East: an update, Andrew Fox’s Substack, Substack.

The Middle East: an update

; Streb, A. (2025, March 27). Usually-Vocal Democrats Suddenly Silent About Palestinian Protests When They Are Against Hamas. Daily Caller. https://dailycaller.com/2025/03/27/usually-vocal-democrats-now-silent-about-palestinian-protests/; Gritten, D. (2025, February 10). Trump says no right of return for Palestinians under Gaza takeover plan. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn57neepx4vo. In my view, the Trump proposal is more geared toward encouraging Arab states to come up with new, innovative proposals on Gaza and the Israel-Palestine conflict as a whole, rather than being something he is fully committed to implementing down to the letter. Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations rely on sumud—a certain steadfastness to the land by their public—to shield them from the consequences of their actions. Testing this steadfastness by allowing emigration options to the war-battered population strikes at the heart of that strategy

4. Gaza exodus accelerates as 1,000 residents depart in March. (2025, March 24). The Jerusalem Post. https://archive.ph/S8iXp. This sentiment to exit Gaza is rather broad and prominent among the Gazan youth according to polls. Indeed, even it existed prior to the war itself. See Zivotofsky, A.Z. (2025, February 26). Do the Gazans want to stay or go? What are they ‘saying’? [blog] The Times of Israel. https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/do-the-gazans-want-to-stay-or-go-what-are-they-saying/; ARAB BAROMETER 8 in Palestine Report IV: Emigration. (2024, June 26). Palestinian Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH. https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/AB8%20Palestine%20Report%204%20English%2026June2024.pdf.

5. Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah ‘step by step,’ say President Aoun. (2025, April 17). The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-850399; Christou, W. (2025, March 3). ‘The price was huge’: Hezbollah reeling as Lebanese ponder sacrifices of its war. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/03/the-price-of-this-war-was-huge-hezbollah-left-reeling-after-conflict-with-israel.

6. Tol, G. & Vatanka, A. (2025, March 18). War of words as Turkey-Iran tensions escalate over Syria, Iraq. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/war-words-turkey-iran-tensions-escalate-over-syria-iraq.

7. US Taking Aim At Iran’s Oil And Financial Networks, Seeking Maximum Pressure ‘Possible.’ (2025, April 2). Kharon. https://www.kharon.com/brief/treasury-department-iran-scott-bessent-maximum-pressure.

8. Faucon, B., Youssef, N.A., & al-Batati, S. (2025, April 14). U.S. Strikes Spur Plans For Yemeni Ground War Against Houthis. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-operation-us-support-975febe6.

9. Russia moves to ratify comprehensive treaty with Iran. (2025, March 27). Iran International. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503279882; Smagin, N. (2025, January 21). New Russia-Iran Treaty Reveals the Limits of Their Partnership. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/russia-iran-strategic-agreement?lang=en.

10. Shamay, I. (2025, February 25). Iran’s energy crisis is worse than reported. Israel HaYom. https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/02/25/irans-energy-crisis-is-worse-than-reported/; Iran’s capital hit by sudden power outages. (2025, February 11). Iran International. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502118457;Karimi, N. & Gambrell, J. (2024, December 12). Bitcoin mining is one of the suspected causes of the power outages disrupting life in Iran. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/iran-blackouts-bitcoin-sanctions-nuclear-program-9ff962e2bc7931e4f4dca79407316df3

11. Water in Crisis—Iran. The Water Project. Retrieved April 18, 2025, from https://thewaterproject.org/water-crisis/water-in-crisis-iran; Mahoozi, S. (2025, March 21). Can’t wash, can’t farm: Iranians battle ‘water bankruptcy.’ Context. https://www.context.news/climate-risks/cant-wash-cant-farm-iranians-battle-water-bankruptcy.

12. Karimi, N. & Gambrell, J. (2025, April 5). Iran’s currency falls to record low against the dollar as tensions run high. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/iran-rial-currency-us-7077a417560efcb6d9cbf7102cbc8b57; Azizi, H. & van Veen, E. (2025, March 31). Running out of road: Iran’s strategic predicament. Clingendael. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/running-out-road-irans-strategic-predicament; von Hein, S. (2025, March 30). Iran’s middle class bears brunt of economic crisis. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/irans-middle-class-bears-brunt-of-economic-crisis/a-72085209.

13. Ghafouri, A. (2024, October 14). New polling highlights Iranians’ views on Iran’s foreign policy and regional roles. Middle East Institute. https://mei.edu/publications/new-polling-highlights-iranians-views-irans-foreign-policy-and-regional-role

14. Ibid.

15. Alfoneh, A. (2024, February 27). Official Government Poll: 72.9% of Iranians Favor Separation of Religion and State. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. https://agsiw.org/official-government-poll-72-9-of-iranians-favor-separation-of-religion-and-state/.

16. Dubowitz, M. Mapping Protests In Iran. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Retrieved on April 17, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/01/27/mapping-the-protests-in-iran-2/; Mahoozi, S. (2025, April 11). Water Crisis Fuels Protests In Iran, Experts Warn It Could Spread. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sanammahoozi/2025/04/11/water-crisis-fuels-protests-in-iran-experts-warn-it-could-spread/.

17. MEMRI. (2025, April 11). Against The Backdrop Of US-Iran Negotiations, Top Iranians Call For Obtaining Nuclear Weapons. https://www.memri.org/reports/against-backdrop-us-iran-negotiations-top-iranian-officials-call-obtaining-nuclear-weapons#_edn2.

18. Director of National Intelligence. (2025). DNI Gabbard Opening Statement as Delivered to the HPSCI on the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2025/4061-ata-hpsci-opening-statement-as-delivered.

19. The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program. Arms Control Association. Retrieved April 17, 2025, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1; Edelson, D. (2025, March 27). U.S. general: Iran could make nuclear breakthrough in less than a week. Ynet. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r19wf5mp1e.

20. Albright, A. (2024). How quickly could Iran make nuclear weapons today? Institute for Science and International Security. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/how-quickly-could-iran-make-nuclear-weapons-today/8; Cordesman, A.H. & Toukan, A. (2014). Iran’s Nuclear Missile Delivery Capability. Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-nuclear-missile-delivery-capability.

21. Barnes, J.E., Schmitt, E., Haberman, M., and Bergman, R. (2025, April 16). Trump Waved Off Israeli Strike After Divisions Emerge in His Administration. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/16/us/politics/trump-israel-iran-nuclear.html.

22. Chicau, D. & Ljunngren, D. (2025, March 30). Trump threatens bombing if Iran does not make nuclear deal. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-there-will-be-bombing-if-iran-does-not-make-nuclear-deal-2025-03-30/.

23. Ebrahim, N. (2025, April 6). An emboldened US and Iran will hold nuclear talks. Is there space for a deal? CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/08/middleeast/us-iran-nuclear-talks-explainer-intl/index.html; Reyes, A. (2025, March 23). Trump administration demands Iran dismantle its nuclear program or face consequences. TNND. https://komonews.com/news/nation-world/trump-administration-demands-iran-dismantle-nuclear-program-or-face-consequences-president-donald-trump-national-security-advisor-mike-waltz-cbs-face-the-nation-hezbollah-hamas.

24. Timotija, F. (2025, April 8). Iran nuclear deal must include destruction of facilities under US supervision: Netanyahu. The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/international/5238270-netanyahu-iran-nuclear-facilities/.

25. Ravid, B. (2025, March 19). Scoop: Trump’s letter to Iran included 2-month deadline for new nuclear deal. Axios. https://www.axios.com/2025/03/19/trump-letter-iran-nuclear-deal. This alleged deadline might not be a hard-and-fast rule but rather a reflection point for Trump. It may just serve as a way for him to assess whether he believes the negotiations are serious and making any progress.

26. Times of Israel and Reuters. (2025, April 15). In swift reversal, Witkoff says any nuclear deal must ‘eliminate’ Iranian enrichment, weaponization. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-swift-reversal-witkoff-says-any-nuclear-deal-must-eliminate-irans-enrichment/; Office of Special Envoy to the Middle East. (2025, April 15). “Any deal with Iran will be completed only if it is a Trump deal.” X. https://x.com/SE_MiddleEast/status/1912141949932298432.

27. AFP and Times of Israel. (2025, April 16). Iran’s FM says uranium enrichment ‘non-negotiable,’ after US says it cannot continue. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-fm-says-uranium-enrichment-non-negotiable-after-us-says-it-cannot-continue/.

28. The Duran. (2025, April 15). US-Iran talks, preventing catastrophic war w/ Dennis Kucinich (Live) [Video]. YouTube, 9:13-9:50.

29. Shuster, M. (2012, June 4). Iran’s Nuclear Fatwa: A Policy Or A Ploy? NPR. https://www.npr.org/2012/06/14/154915222/irans-nuclear-fatwa-a-policy-or-a-ploy.

30. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025). Annual Threat Assessment Of The U.S. Intelligence Community, 26. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

31. Shuster (2012). Iran’s Nuclear Fatwa.

32. MEMRI. (2025, February 11). Iranian Regime Continues To Lie About The Alleged Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons. https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-regime-continues-lie-about-alleged-fatwa-banning-nuclear-weapons.

33. Shuster (2012). Iran’s Nuclear Fatwa.

34. The original statement is italicized and bolded. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025). Annual Threat Assessment, 22. Iran continues to try to cause instability in Syria and Lebanon to advance their interests even in their diminished state. See Beeri, T. (2025, April 10). Recalculating Route- The Iran and Hezbollah Corridor to Lebanon. Alma Research and Education Center. https://israel-alma.org/recalculating-route-the-iran-and-hezbollah-corridor-to-lebanon/; Tol, G. & Vantanka, A. (2025, March 18). War of words as Turkey-Iran tensions escalate.

35. Johnson, S. (1750, March 24). The necessity and danger of looking into futurity. The Rambler, (2). https://www.johnsonessays.com/the-rambler/no-2-the-necessity-and-danger-of-looking-into-futurity/.

36. Ibid.

37. Appendix E: Iran’s Ballistic Missiles and the Nuclear Deal. Arms Control Association. Retrieved on April 17, 2025, from https://www.armscontrol.org/2015-08/appendix-e-irans-ballistic-missiles-nuclear-deal; Schaefer, B.D. (2022, December 19). The Biden Administration’s Iran Deal Fable. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/the-biden-administrations-iran-deal-fable.

38. Fleitz, F. (2020). Stolen Nuclear Documents Confirm Iran Cheated on the JCPOA. Center for Security Policy. https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Iran_JCPOA_paper_final-1.pdf.

39. Carrell-Billiard, F. & Wing, C. Iran and the NPT. International Peace Institute. Retrieved on April 17, 2025, from https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/pdfs_iranchapt.pdf; Kwong, J. (2025, April 9). Bargaining Short of the Bomb: A Strategy for Preventing Iranian NPT Withdrawal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/04/bargaining-short-of-the-bomb-a-strategy-for-preventing-iranian-npt-withdrawal?lang=en.

40. The Duran. (2025). US-Iran talks, 16:39-17:35.

41. The Duran frequently criticizes neoconservatives and neoliberals for their ideological worldview. While there are certainly flaws in both, focusing exclusively on these Western ideologies overlooks the presence of similarly destructive forces outside the West.

42. I find the commentary by Dan Linneaus interesting, especially regarding what might matter in a potential deal and how Iran could save face if it chooses to effectively disarm its program. However, according to Linneaus, force is likely to be employed, making a deal unlikely. Linneaus, D. (2025, April 16). The Iran Witkoff-Araghchi talks are wildly flattened in media and diplomatic chatter. X. https://x.com/DanLinnaeus/status/1912530629612511288. See also Ibid. (2025, April 2). Are there any credible diplomatic off-ramps in the U.S.-Iran nuclear detente at this point? X. https://x.com/DanLinnaeus/status/1907503245288943964.

43. Isaacson, G. (2025, April 16). Khamenei calls for Israel’s destruction: Netanyahu vows to respond. JFeed. https://www.jfeed.com/news-israel/khamenei-netanyahu-iran-israel-confrontation.

44. Levs, J. (2014, November 10). Iran’s leader calls for the ‘annihilation’ of Israel sparks fury as nuclear deadline looms. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/10/world/meast/iran-annihilate-israel/index.html.

45. Mitra, C. (2024, October 5). “Israel Won’t Last Long”: Iran’s Khamenei’s First Public Sermon In 5 Years. NDTV World. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/massive-turnout-as-khamenei-delivers-rare-friday-sermon-amid-israel-crisis-6714056.

46. Beres, L.R. (2024). Dangerously Ignored Intersections: Palestinian Statehood and Regional Nuclear War. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. https://besacenter.org/dangerously-ignored-intersections-palestinian-statehood-and-regional-nuclear-war/; Penthokoukis, J. (2012, February 24). What Would One Big Nuke Do To Israel? This…American Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/what-would-one-big-nuke-do-to-israel-this/; The Iranian Ticking Bomb. (2002). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iranian-ticking-bomb. One may hilariously posit that the officials saying this post 2003 were unaware of their dear leader’s fatwa.

47. MacAskil, E. & McGreal, C. (2005, October 25). Israel should be wiped off map, says Iran's president. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/27/israel.iran.

48. Iran International Newsroom. (2023, October 25). Iran Holds Quds Day Parade, Warning Region Against Ties With Israel. Iran International. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202304148389.

49. Ibid.

50. The history of Iran vs the US. (2024, February 17). The Week. https://theweek.com/politics/iran-and-the-usa-history.

51. Pardo, E.J. (2022). Iran’s Radical Education: An Interim Update Report. The Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education. https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Irans-Radical-Education-7.pdf.

52. US sanctions Swedish drug gang tied to Iran that has attacked Israelis, Jews in Europe. (2025, March 12). JNS. https://www.jns.org/us-state-treasury-sanction-swedish-drug-gang-in-connection-with-iran/; Argentina court blames Iran for deadly 1994 bombing of Jewish center. (2024, April 12). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/12/argentina-iran-1994-amia-bombing; Iran is using criminal networks in Sweden. (2024, May 30). Swedish Security Service. https://sakerhetspolisen.se/ovriga-sidor/other-languages/english-engelska/press-room/news/news/2024-05-30-iran-is-using-criminal-networks-in-sweden.html; Olson, J.M. (2024, May 30). Stockholm accuses Iran of using criminals in Sweden to target Israel or Jewish interests. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/sweden-iran-israel-criminal-gangs-proxy-d50a17efab629a585e281854d3e11407.

53. Iran Order to Pay $239 Million to Victims of the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing. (2024). CohenMilstein. https://www.cohenmilstein.com/iran-ordered-to-pay-239-million-to-victims-and-families-of-the-1983-beirut-marine-barracks-bombing/; Office of the Historian. The Iranian Hostage Crisis. Retrieved on April 17, 2025. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises

54. Times of Israel & Associated Press. (2024, June 28). Iran’s sole reformist candidate wants warm ties ‘with all countries expect Israel.’ The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-sole-reformist-candidate-wants-warm-ties-with-all-countries-except-israel/.

55. The Duran (2025). US-Iran talks, 34:35-35:15. I also recall that, early in the Iran-Israel exchange of strikes, commentators on The Duran claimed that Iran held escalatory dominance. This assessment proved (predictably in my view) incorrect. The shift became clear when Iranian journalists began publicly lamenting that Israel could dismantle their air defenses with impunity — and that supposed allies, like Russia, offered no meaningful support. See Davar, F. (2024, October 29). Anti-Russian Sentiment Surges in Iran After Israel’s Attack Exposes Moscow’s Inaction. IranWire. https://iranwire.com/en/politics/135529-anti-russian-sentiment-surges-in-iran-after-israels-attack-exposes-moscows-inaction/; Sinaiee, M. (2024, October 30). Iranian media reproach Moscow for silence on Israel’s air strikes. Iran International. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202410290901.

56. Spelled Tamuz in this article. Achom, D. (2023, October 11). In 1981, Israel Bombed Nuclear Reactor In Iraq. Why It’s Relevant Today. NDTV World. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/operation-opera-daring-1981-airstrike-on-nuclear-reactor-in-focus-as-israel-faces-multi-front-war-4471744

57. Stow, N. (2019, December 3). Inside abandoned Babylon built by Saddam Hussein who though he was reincarnation of ancient king Nebuchadnezzar. The U.S. Sun. https://www.the-sun.com/news/us-news/116748/inside-abandoned-babylon-built-by-saddam-hussein-who-thought-he-was-reincarnation-of-ancient-king-nebuchadnezzar/.

58. Brad. (2015, September 3). Israeli Raid on the Reactor [Video]. YouTube, 5:47-6:02.

. The Iranians appeared to not buy it as they bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1980 but caused only minor damage. Jones, N. (2012, March 9). Document Friday: When Iran Bombed Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor. Unredacted. https://unredacted.com/2012/03/09/document-friday-when-iran-bombed-iraqs-nuclear-reactor/.

59. Wonder. (2024, September 7). Operation Orchard: The Explosive Raid on Syria’s Nuclear Facility [Video]. YouTube.

.

60. Egyptian Military Analyst General (Ret.) Samir Farag: If Iran Obtains Nuclear Weapons, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, And Other Arab Countries Will Also Want Them. (2024, April 20). MEMRI. https://www.memri.org/tv/egypt-military-analyst-gen-samir-farag-if-iran-gets-nukes-we-want-them-too; Saudi Arabia will get bomb if Iran does, crown prince says. (2018). AFP. https://www.trtworld.com/mea/saudi-arabia-will-get-nuclear-bomb-if-iran-does-crown-prince-says-15938/amp?utm_source=googlenewsstand&utm_medium=amp_rss; Dziadosz, A. & Awad, M. (2010, December 2). Egypt says may seek atomic arms if Iran does: WikiLeaks cables. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wikileaks-egypt/egypt-says-may-seek-atomic-arms-if-iran-does-wikileaks-cables-idUSTRE6B13YT20101202/.

61. The White House. (2025, February 4). National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/;The White House. (2006, February 4). Statement by US President George W. Bush on the IAEA Board Vote to Report Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran Watch. https://www.iranwatch.org/library/government/united-states/executive-branch/white-house/statement-us-president-george-w-bush-iaea-board-vote-report-iran-un-security-council.

62. Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea. (June 2024). Arms Control Association.https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea; US, N. Korea hold their position tight at 6-party talks. (2004, February 25). China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/25/content_309259.htm.

63. There remains the question of whether Israel possesses the necessary arsenal to carry out such a strike. This analysis proceeds under the assumption that it does. Should that assumption prove false, then the argument becomes moot on the grounds of capability.

64. Hulkower, I. (2024, January 7). Israel’s Challenges In Gaza: Examining Some Post-War Scenarios. The Platform Mag, (24), https://www.theplatformmag.com/edition-24-articles/israel-s-challenges-in-gaza-examining-some-post-war-scenarios.