When life itself seems lunatic, who knows where madness lies? Perhaps to be too practical is madness. To surrender dreams—this may be madness. Too much sanity may be madness—and madness of all: to see life as it is, and not as it should be!1
Fordow: The Target And Symbol
The mountain beckons and baits its foe; whether it is a trap, none can yet know. The nuclear enrichment facility built into a mountain —Fordow—became the icon of the entire Iranian nuclear program. The destruction of this mountain fortress, it was hinted, would in its own way symbolize the termination of the entire nuclear program itself. This was, after all, the same facility where the IAEA reportedly found traces of uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent during a 2023 inspection, which was very close to official weapons-grade enrichment.2 This discovery was, according to the IAEA, “inconsistent with the level of enrichment at the Fordow plant as declared by Iran.”3
The massive nuclear plant, buried under many meters of rock next to the holy city of Qom, presented difficult challenges to its attackers. The Israelis had already inflicted significant damage on many other nuclear sites in Iran as part of their Operation Rising Lion aerial campaign, which commenced on June 13, 2025.4 While the Israelis maintained they could attack and neutralize Fordow,5 there was an expectation that the United States would join in the assault.6
A Contentious Decision
The particular weapon in the American arsenal said to be capable of carrying out such a daunting mission was the GBU-57, a 30,000-pound bunker-buster bomb.7 However, its use required a decision from the United States. When Israel first struck Iran, Trump had positioned himself as the man who could restrain Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—if the Iranians made a deal.8 The image of an honest broker in the conflict would crumble if the U.S. became a direct participant in hostile action.
While Trump did campaign on thwarting an Iranian nuclear bomb,9 he also vowed to keep Americans out of “stupid wars”—especially further violent entanglement in Middle Eastern wars.10 The entire episode in Iran to many in the United States and in Trump’s coalition conjured up unnerving and bitter memories of the 2003 American intervention in Iraq. Claims of a quick foreign intervention, justified by a sudden nuclear threat, were this time met with intense skepticism. It did not help that Netanyahu, who testified in Congress in favor of intervening in Iraq as a private citizen, was the poster child for such claims.
Nor was the intelligence community in full agreement on Iranian intentions. The non-interventionists also had fodder in that American intelligence contradicted Israeli sources claiming an Iranian rush to a bomb.11 While IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi conceded that he could not account for clandestine activity, he stated that “we did not have any proof of a systematic effort [by Iran] to move into a nuclear weapon” during an interview.12 All of these statements served to instill doubt over whether the immediacy of action was required and whether Iran had even decided to go for a bomb.
There were even reports that the Iranians were eager to return to the negotiating table and promised flexibility—provided the United States halted the Israeli attacks.13 Accusations that Israel was dragging the United States into its war with Iran rang out even in the United States Senate.14 These claims carried weight in a country that, even before the strikes, already held a majority unfavorable view of Israel and low confidence in Netanyahu—especially among the youth of both major political parties.15
Trump’s coalition wanted the president to focus on domestic policies and avoid costly foreign adventures—particularly the kind feared in an intervention in Iran. “If he pulls the trigger, it's all over for MAGA,” Richard Baris, a top-rate pollster, said. The prospect of a rising Republican majority would be gone “for a decade” if things went south, he warned.16 He tweeted:
Starting new foreign wars never helps a presidency. But it sure as Hell can end one, especially one predicated on not starting new wars overseas when we've been invaded and neglected at home.17
Put simply, Trump’s coalition was already at risk of fracture prior to any actual American intervention against Iran. The Never Trump outlet, The Bulwark, ironically made the same argument by noting that the Iran crisis had made us “all globalists now” and that “America First” is dead, if it ever really existed.”18 There was the risk that bombs over Fordow may not only blow-up Iranian infrastructure but also Trump’s coalition.
The clamor against the need for direct intervention reached such a pitch that Vice President J.D. Vance took to X to explain the president’s position and assuage public fears. He explained that over recent months, the president had urged his foreign policy team to negotiate a deal with Iran to prevent nuclear weapons development. The president made it clear that uranium enrichment by Iran was unacceptable and emphasized that resolving this issue could happen peacefully or through other measures, with any further action being his decision alone. While acknowledging public worries about getting involved in foreign conflicts—especially given the last 25 years of troubled U.S. foreign policy—Vance asserted that the president had earned trust by focusing strictly on achieving American goals.19 The vice president’s outreach drew widespread feedback, reflecting some of the public’s nervousness about the administration’s approach.20
Decision Point
On June 19, the White House announced that the president would decide Iran’s fate “within two weeks.”21 Some interpreted this as a preview that Trump might drag his foot over making a decision.22 However, veteran reporter Seymour Hersh published an article revealing details about the administration’s war plans and shared intelligence from American and Israeli insiders indicating a “heavy American bombing” campaign in Iran was likely to begin that weekend. The operation’s primary goals were not only to destroy the advanced centrifuges protected within mountain-shielded Fordow but also to remove the Supreme Leader of Iran from power.23
As predicted, the strike took place on Saturday, June 21st, but it was not an all-out bombing campaign. American bombers hit three nuclear sites: Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz. In a brief national address, Trump claimed these facilities were “totally obliterated” and called on Iran to pursue peace before the U.S. would be forced to take further action.24
Satellite images following the Fordow attack showed six bunker-bomb-created holes in the mountain. Experts debated the extent of damage sustained by the nuclear facility, largely because there was no clear confirmation or imagery of destruction below ground.25 A senior Iranian official told Reuters that most of the enriched uranium had been relocated before the bombing. This declaration was supported by satellite images showing a long line of vehicles at Fordow’s entrance in the days leading up to the strike.26
When asked about the uranium’s whereabouts, Prime Minister Netanyahu said he had been monitoring the situation closely and possessed “interesting intel,” though he refused to elaborate further. While he acknowledged that enriched uranium was “an important component,” the prime minister maintained that it was “not the sole component” nor “a sufficient component” of the nuclear program.27 President Trump, however, firmly denied that Iran had moved its nuclear materials prior to the attack.28
Israeli Strikes
Earlier applications of Israel’s Begin Doctrine were swift, technical operations—single-day strikes aimed at dismantling enemy states' nuclear programs. Operation Rising Lion, by contrast, was a far more ambitious, multi-day effort. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was significantly more dispersed and fortified than the Iraqi or Syrian facilities Israel had previously targeted. In addition to nuclear sites, Rising Lion, also targeted Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities—some of which were believed capable of carrying nuclear warheads.29
But the Israeli campaign had another dimension. From the outset, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s rhetoric suggested regime change might be part of the agenda.30 Some analysts interpreted this as strategic posturing—a way to pressure the Ayatollah into making concessions to the Americans.31 Others saw deeper intent, pointing to reports that Trump had vetoed Netanyahu’s proposal to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader.32 This, they argued, implied regime change may have been considered, even if it wasn’t a declared objective. After the Fordow bombing, even Trump echoed regime change sentiments in a Truth Social post, lending credence to the idea that removing the Islamic Republic's leadership was, at the very least, part of the broader conversation.33
The Persian Prince Who Was Promised
Amid the tumult of the military operation and the clamor for regime change, the long-exiled crown prince of Iran Reza Pahlavi, stepped forward to position himself as an alternative to the ruling theocracy. His father, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had ruled Iran for decades before being overthrown in the 1979 revolution that brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a cleric and the first Supreme Leader of Iran, to power. The crown prince solemnly declared that:
The Islamic Republic has come to its end and is collapsing. What has begun is irreversible. The future is bright, and together we will turn the page of history. Now is the time to stand up; the time to reclaim Iran. May I be with you soon.34
Throughout the brief war, Pahlavi made similar appeals, portraying the regime as nearing its end and pledging to replace it with a secular, democratic government.35 His rhetoric sought to cast himself as the heir not just to a throne, but to a future free of clerical rule.36
This was not the first time Pahlavi had been considered for a possible return to power. In the early 1980s, reports surfaced that Israel and the U.S. had entertained the idea of overthrowing the Islamic Republic and reinstalling the crown prince. That effort was ultimately abandoned after the resignations of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1982. Their successors—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Moshe Arens37—committed to ending such foreign adventures.38
Ultimately, no coup or regime change has materialized from the current operation. In fact, some reports suggest that rather than weakening, the Iranian regime responded to the attacks by tightening its grip on society, with the public rallying around the flag.39 It’s possible that part of Israel’s strategic aim was psychological: to instill a sense of vulnerability in ordinary Iranians by demonstrating that the regime's foreign policy was making the country less secure. Although a 2024 poll showed that most adult Iranians blamed the regime’s foreign policy for the country’s economic troubles, a similarly overwhelming majority believed that same policy made Iran safer.40 Israeli officials may have hoped that a short, high-profile conflict could shake that belief and prompt a shift in public sentiment—one that might eventually lead to internal pressure for change.
A Denouement: Sudden Ceasefire After Fordow Bombing
Regime change or not, the U.S. bombing of Fordow marked a dramatic escalation in the conflict. But tensions were swiftly defused when Iran responded with a symbolic retaliation—a limited strike on a U.S. base in Qatar that caused no injuries or damage. Trump, true to form, dismissed the response as “weak,” yet he also praised Iran for providing advance notice and called for peace.41
Later that same day, Trump announced that a ceasefire agreement had been reached among all parties. The purpose was clear: to bring an end to the war between Israel and Iran, which he branded “THE 12 DAY WAR.”42 Whether the events following Fordow had been choreographed or not, an off-ramp had been presented—and taken—to avoid prolonged hostilities. The operation wrapped up within the timeframe the Israelis had previously outlined, with one official stating early in the war that the operational aim was to “cause enough damage [to the nuclear program] to revert to diplomacy and get a good agreement.”43 So far, the ceasefire has held.
The cost of the war for Israel included 591 missiles launched by Iran, resulting in 29 deaths,44 3,491 injuries, and nearly 40,000 property tax claims for war-related damage. Official estimates noted that only 10–15 percent of the missiles were not intercepted.45 Iran, for its part, suffered significant casualties: 1,054 dead and 4,476 injured. According to the HRANA News Agency, of the dead, 318 were military personnel, 417 were civilians, and 319 were unidentified.46
In the end, the bombing of Fordow was about more than just a fortified nuclear facility. It became the crucible where America’s post-Iraq restraint, Israel’s existential doctrine, and Iran’s revolutionary identity collided—with consequences not just for the Middle East, but for the identity of American power itself. Trump emerged from the rubble with a ceasefire that helped preserve his domestic political coalition. Netanyahu could assure his constituents that Israel had taken decisive action against Iran’s nuclear program, while enjoying a rare moment of public unity. The Iranian regime could claim it had weathered the storm.
Return To Diplomacy
Since the cessation of hostilities, Trump has announced that the Iranians are willing to return to negotiations and pursue a possible agreement. He outlined the conditions: Iran must agree not to develop a nuclear bomb and must end uranium enrichment. Trump added that, following the military operation, he no longer particularly “care[d]” whether such “an agreement” with Iran was reached.47Nonetheless, he warned that the United States stood ready to strike again if Iran resumed enrichment efforts.48 Steven Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, echoed these terms.49Notably, these were not new demands—they reflected longstanding U.S. and Israeli positions already presented in previous, moribund rounds of negotiation.50
Earlier, after a second meeting on April 19, the U.S. and Iran had reportedly made progress, moving into technical discussions. Witkoff commented at the time on proposed caps to Iran’s nuclear program, but reiterated that enrichment on Iranian soil must cease.51 In early June, the U.S. presented an interim proposal that would have allowed Iran to continue low-level enrichment temporarily, until a regional consortium assumed responsibility for the process.52 Iranian diplomats, however, rejected the offer outright.53
Reflecting on the negotiation process, Vice President J.D. Vance stated that while there had been signs of progress in March, by mid-May the Iranians were “stonewalling.” He claimed Iran had “stopped negotiating in good faith,” which he identified as “the real catalyst” for the military strike.54
Whether the bombing was a calculated escalation intended to break the diplomatic deadlock—or an unnecessary gamble that risked fracturing Trump’s domestic coalition—remains open to debate. While the destruction of Fordow may have temporarily disrupted Iran’s enrichment capability, the absence of a durable agreement leaves that achievement potentially reversible. The ceasefire ended the war, but whether it ends the standoff that sparked it remains uncertain.
De Cervantes, M. Quotable Quote. Retrieved on June 23, 2025 from https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1272757-when-life-itself-seems-lunatic-who-knows-where-madness-lies
Pourahmadi, A. (2023, March 1). Near bomb-grade uranium found in nuclear plant, says IAEA report. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/01/middleeast/iran-uranium-enrichment-iaea-intl/index.html. Although the nuclear watchdog agency lists 90 percent enrichment as weapons-grade, in reality, Little Boy—the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima—had an average enrichment level of approximately 80 percent. See Rubin, M. (2025, July 15). ‘Dirty Bomb’ Attack: This Could Be Iran’s Next Move Against Israel. American Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/op-eds/dirty-bomb-attack-this-could-be-irans-next-move-against-israel/.
Pourahmadi, A. (2023, March 1). Near bomb-grade uranium found.
See footnote 3, Hulkower, I. (2025, June 15). Zero Hour: The Strike on Iran And Its Aftermath. Substack. https://substack.com/home/post/p-165985136; Ferragamo, M. (2025, June 23). U.S., Israel Attack Iranian Nuclear Targets—Assessing the Damage. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/us-israel-attack-iranian-nuclear-targets-assessing-damage.
Netanyahu: Israel can destroy all of Iran’s nuclear sites without US help. (2025, June 20). NHK World Japan. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250620_12/. For at least some of the options for the Israelis in attacking Fordow, see Williams, H. (2025, July 18). Options for Targeting Iran’s Fordow Nuclear Facility. Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/options-targeting-irans-fordow-nuclear-facility.
Berman, L. (2025, June 19). Israel expecting US decision on joining Iran strikes in 24-48 hours, says official. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-expecting-us-decision-on-joining-iran-strikes-in-24-48-hours-says-official/.
Williams, H. (2025, July 18). Options for Targeting Iran’s Fordow Nuclear Facility; Uchimiya, E. (2025, June 21). What to know about the MOP and the B-2, the bunker-buster bomb and plane that could be used to strike Iran. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/massive-ordnance-penetrator-bomb-gbu-57-b-2-bomber-iran-fordo-nuclear-facility/.
Hulkower, I. (2025, June 15). Zero Hour.
President Trump Has Always Been Clear: Iran Cannot Have a Nuclear Weapon. (2025, June 17). The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/06/president-trump-has-always-been-clear-iran-cannot-have-a-nuclear-weapon/.
Madhani, A. & Boak, J. (2025, June 22). Trump’s big gamble in Iran is a risky moment after his pledge to keep US out of ‘stupid wars.’ The Associated Press. https://www.startribune.com/with-us-airstrikes-trump-aims-to-deliver-a-decisive-blow-to-a-weakened-iran/601377257.
Megerian, C., & Klepper, D. (2025, June 17). Trump dismisses US spy agencies’ assessment on Iran’s nuclear program. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/gabbard-trump-intelligence-iran-nuclear-program-51c8d85d536f8628870c110ac05bb518; Myre, G. & Brumfiel, G. (2025, June 18). Israeli and U.S. intelligence differ on status of Iran’s nuclear program. Who’s right? NPR.https://www.npr.org/2025/06/18/nx-s1-5436758/israel-and-u-s-intelligence-differ-on-status-of-irans-nuclear-program-whos-right. While Tulsi Gabbard later posted that the U.S. had intelligence indicating Iran could produce a nuclear weapon within weeks or months, she did not concede that this assessment originated from the U.S. intelligence community or that Iran had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. See DNI Tulsi Gabbard. (2025, June 20). The dishonest media is intentionally taking my testimony out of context and spreading fake news as a way to manufacture division .X. https://x.com/DNIGabbard/status/1936174674595008517.
Zhang, S. (2025, June 18). IAEA Head: “We Did Not Have Any Proof” Of Iran Building Nuclear Weapon. TruthOut. https://truthout.org/articles/iaea-head-we-did-not-have-any-proof-of-iran-building-nuclear-weapon/.
Reuters. (2025, June 19). Iran holding direct talks with US, says it could bend on nukes if attacks stop. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-holding-direct-talks-with-us-says-it-could-bend-on-nukes-if-attacks-end/.
Waldvogel, M. (2025, June 20). Van Hollen: Netanyahu ‘has always wanted to drag’ US ‘into war with Iran.’ The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/5361150-van-hollen-netanyahu-iran-war/.
Silver, L. (2025, April 8). How Americans View Israel and the Hamas-Israel war at start of Trump’s second term. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/04/08/how-americans-view-israel-and-the-israel-hamas-war-at-the-start-of-trumps-second-term/.
Rahman, K. (2025, June 17). Trump’s Most Favorable Pollster Warns It Could Be ‘All Over for MAGA.’ Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-pollster-warns-all-over-maga-iran-israel-2086637.
Rich Baris The People’s Pundit. (2025, June 16). Starting new foreign wars never helps a presidency. X. https://x.com/Peoples_Pundit/status/1934762401045623270.
Kristol, W., Egger, A., & Swift, J. (2025, June 20). ‘America First’ Is Dead. The Bulwark. https://substack.com/home/post/p-166395794.
JD Vance. (2025, June 17). Look, I'm seeing this from the inside, and am admittedly biased towards our president (and my friend). X. https://x.com/JDVance/status/1934996183702704404.
For interesting feedback, see Robert Barnes. (2025, June 17). An answer to @JDVance --. X. https://x.com/barnes_law/status/1935028277401534696.
Rosman, R. (2025, June 19). Trump to decide ‘within two weeks,’ White House says. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2025/06/19/nx-s1-5439075/israel-iran-conflict-hospital.
Treisman, R. (2025, June 20). Trump is no stranger to setting 2-week deadlines. Here’s how others have played out. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2025/06/20/nx-s1-5440143/trump-two-weeks-deadline-pattern.
Hersh, S. (2025, June 19). WHAT I HAVE BEEN TOLD IS COMING IN IRAN. Substack. https://substack.com/home/post/p-166335210.
Bennett, B. & Popli, N. (2025, June 21). U.S. Joins Israel in Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Sites, Risking Wider War. Time. https://time.com/7296469/u-s-strikes-iran-nuclear-trump-war/.
Brumfiel, G., & Hurt, A. (2025, June 22). Satellites show damage to Iran’s nuclear program, but experts say it’s not destroyed. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2025/06/22/nx-s1-5441734/satellites-show-damage-iran-nuclear-program-not-destroyed-experts-say; Reuters and Times of Israel. (2025, June 23). Satellite images indicate severe damage to Fordo in US strikes, but doubts remain. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/satellite-images-indicate-severe-damage-to-fordo-in-us-strikes-but-doubts-remain/. See also Reuters. (2025, June 24). Early US assessment suggests strikes on Iran did not destroy nuclear sites, CNN reports; White House denies it. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/early-us-intel-assessment-suggests-strikes-on-iran-did-not-destroy-nuclear-sites-cnn-reports-white-house-denies-it/. The Israelis bombed the same area again days later to obstruct access routes to Fordow. Crisp, E. (2025, June 23). Israel strikes Iran’s Fordow nuclear bunker site again, damage unclear. The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/international/5363919-israel-iran-nuclear-fordow-strike/. The IAEA, for its part, found evidence suggesting that the strikes “may have caused localized contamination and chemical hazards” at the nuclear sites, see Associated Press. (2025, June 24). IAEA says additional impacts from US strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran may have caused localized contamination. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/iaea-says-additional-impacts-from-us-strikes-on-nuclear-facilities-in-iran-may-have-caused-localized-contamination/. The Iranians, for their part, admitted that their nuclear installations incurred heavy damage from the American-Israeli bombing. See Iran Admits Heavy Nuclear Damage as Israel Backs Trump. (2025, June 25). Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/israel-backs-trump-iran-nuclear-site-damage-2090538.
Reuters and Times of Israel. (2025, June 23). Satellite images indicate severe damage.
Netanyahu says Israel close to meeting its goals in Iran. (2025, June 22). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-israel-close-meeting-its-goals-iran-2025-06-22/. For other Israeli officials discussing their monitoring of enriched material in Iran, see Jerusalem Post. (2025, June 24). Israel reportedly knows location of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, Saudi outlet claims. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-858895.
Gangitano, A. (2025, June 24). Trump denies Iranians moved nuclear materials before US strikes. The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5368790-trump-iran-nuclear-materials-moved/.
Per Netanyahu: “We also struck at the heart of Iran’s ballistic missile program. Last year, Iran fired 300 ballistic missiles at Israel. Each of these missiles carries a ton of explosives and threatens the lives of hundreds of people. Soon, those missiles could carry a nuclear payload, threatening the lives not of hundreds, but of millions. Iran is gearing up to produce 10,000 of those ballistic missiles within three years. Now, just imagine, imagine 10,000 tons of TNT landing on a country the size of New Jersey. This is an intolerable threat. It, too, must be stopped.” Jones, C. (2025, June 12). Read Benjamin Netanyahu’s full speech to Israelis on Iran attack. National Post. https://nationalpost.com/news/world/benjamin-netanyahu-speech-iran-attack. Netanyahu’s June 24 victory speech also touched on both the nuclear and ballistic missile threats. See Times Now. (2025, June 24). Netanyahu Hails ‘Historic Victory’ Over Iran [Video]. YouTube.
.On the nuclear feasibility of Iranian ballistic missiles, see Elleman, M. & Fitzgerald, M. (2018). Assessing whether Iran’s ballistic missiles are designed to be nuclear capable. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/images/comment/analysis/2018/february/documents/assessing-irans-ballistic-missiles-iiss-report-2018.pdf#:~:text=Missiles%20exceeding%20this%20standard%2C%20as%20eight%20of,be%20inherently%20capable%20of%20delivering%20nuclear%20weapons.
See footnote 17 in Hulkower, I. (2025, June 15). Zero Hour; Martina, M. & Jackson, K. (2025, June 15). Netanyahu says regime change in Iran could be result of Israel’s attacks. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-regime-change-iran-could-be-result-israels-attacks-2025-06-15/; Ravid, B. (2025, June 17). Israel wants regime change in Iran, Trump is unconvinced. Axios. https://www.axios.com/2025/06/17/iran-regime-change-israel-war-trump; Simmons, K. & Rajvanshi, A. (2025, June 17). Israel’s Netanyahu doesn’t rule out targeting Iran’s supreme leader and regime change. NBC. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/israel-iran-netanyahu-khamenei-trump-regime-change-rcna213425.
See Michael Doran’s comments in The Free Press. (2025, June 16). How Trump and Bibi Outfoxed Iran [Video]. YouTube.
. 1:08:02-1:08:28. Even Doran acknowledged that this terminology grated against many in Trump’s base, who prefer stability over the chaos that regime change invites. He later added that “the Israelis are walking a line between just trying to take out the nuclear program and threatening the regime” admitting that this line could be crossed during the operation (see 1:09:09–1:10:16). For Israeli denials that they were seeking regime change, see Koningsveld, A. (2025, June 24). PMO: Regime change in Iran not war goal. JNS. https://www.jns.org/pmo-regime-change-in-iran-not-war-goal/; Jie, L.H. (2025, June 18). Israeli president denies pursuing regime change in Iran —goal is to ‘remove’ nuclear program. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/19/israeli-president-denies-pursuing-regime-change-in-iran.html; Tedesco, M. (2025, June 19). ‘Israel is not in the business of a regime change’: Israeli ambassador. ABC 3340 News. https://abc3340.com/news/nation-world/israel-is-not-in-the-business-of-a-regime-change-israeli-foreign-minister-yechiel-leiter.
Holland, S. (2025, June 13). Trump vetoed Israeli plan to kill Iran’s supreme leader, US officials say. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-vetoed-an-israeli-plan-kill-irans-supreme-leader-us-officials-say-2025-06-15/.
Donald J. Trump. (2025, June 22). It’s not politically correct to use the term, “Regime Change,” but if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn’t there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!! Truth Social. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114729009239087163.
Reza Pahlavi. (2025, June 17). The Islamic Republic has come to its end and is collapsing. What has begun is irreversible. The future is bright, and together we will turn the page of history. Now is the time to stand up; the time to reclaim Iran. May I be with you soon. X. https://x.com/PahlaviReza/status/1935037345461653974.
Ibid. (2025, June 23). My fellow compatriots, We are now moving to the final phase of our struggle. It will be hard. But the regime is weak. It is near collapse. Only we, the Iranian people, can end it. X. https://x.com/PahlaviReza/status/1937487862133354625.
Ibid. (2025, June 23). The complete text of my opening remarks at today's press conference. X. https://x.com/PahlaviReza/status/1937114098841403500.
Arens, incidentally, was a political mentor to Benjamin Netanyahu. See Pfeffer, A. (2019, January 9). Moshe Arens, who died this week, was the young Benjamin Netanyahu’s mentor. The Jewish Chronicle. https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/moshe-arens-who-died-this-week-was-the-young-benjamin-netanyahus-mentor-xhzgotkb.
Fisher, D. (1988, October 28). Sharon Linked to ’82 Anti-Khomeini Coup Plot. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-10-28-mn-352-story.html.
Hanedar, F. & Canli, E. (2025, June 21). Israeli experts say Tel Aviv’s goal of overthrowing Iranian government unlikely to succeed. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-experts-say-tel-avivs-goal-of-overthrowing-iranian-government-unlikely-to-succeed/3607216; Stein, A. (2025, June 20). Israel’s strikes on Iran: No sign of regime instability since operation. The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-858439.
Ghafouri, A. (2024, October 14). New polling highlights Iranians’ views on Iran’s foreign policy and regional roles. Middle East Institute. https://mei.edu/publications/new-polling-highlights-iranians-views-irans-foreign-policy-and-regional-role.
Mills, A., Hafezi, P., & Cornwell, A. (2025, June 23). Iran fires missiles at US base in Qatar, Trump calls for peace. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-weighs-retaliation-against-us-strikes-nuclear-sites-2025-06-23/.
Donald J. Trump (2025, June 23). CONGRATULATIONS TO EVERYONE! Truth Social. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114734934153569653.
Berman, L. (2025, June 16). Official says Israel’s operation in Iran expected to last 2-3 weeks, end goal is tight nuclear agreement. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/official-says-israels-operation-in-iran-expected-to-last-2-3-weeks-end-goal-is-tight-nuclear-agreement/.
The majority of the casualties were female and of non-military age.
Real Time Tracker: Operation Rising Lion. The Institute for National Security Studies. Retrieved on June 25, 2025, from https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-real-time/.
Twelve Days of War: Israel-Iran Ceasefire Comes into Force. (2025, June 25). HRANA. https://www.en-hrana.org/twelve-days-of-war-israel-iran-ceasefire-comes-into-force/. For a civilian casualty analysis on the 11th day of the war by both sides, see Avi Bitterman, MD. (2025, June 24). Civilian Causality Ratio (CCR) for Israel on Iran and Iran on Israel. https://x.com/AviBittMD/status/1937622965488599538. On Iranian disinformation regarding a hospital it struck, see Jones, M.G. (2025, June 19). Verifying conflicting narratives about Iran’s strike on an Israeli hospital. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/20/verifying-conflicting-narratives-about-irans-strike-on-an-israeli-hospital. To be sure, Israeli authorities imposed military censorship regarding filming and broadcasting Iranian strikes on military sites during the war. See Israel censors foreign press coverage of Iranian strike sites. (2025, June 23). Committee to Protect Journalists. https://cpj.org/2025/06/israel-censors-foreign-press-coverage-of-iranian-strike-sites/.
Berman et al. (2025, June 25). Trump says US will meet with Iran next week, asserts nuke deal ‘no longer necessary.’ The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-says-us-will-meet-with-iran-next-week-asserts-nuke-deal-no-longer-necessary/.
Berman, L. (2025, June 25). Trump says Israel sent agents into Iran’s Fordo nuclear site, saw ‘total obliteration.’ The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-says-israel-sent-agents-into-irans-fordo-nuclear-site-saw-obliteration/.
Reuters. (2025, June 25). Nuclear enrichment and weaponization are US red lines on Iran, Witkoff tells CNBC. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/nuclear-enrichment-and-weaponization-are-us-red-lines-on-iran-witkoff-tells-cnbc/
See Hulkower, I. (2025, June 15). Zero Hour; Hulkower, I. (2025, April 21). The Approaching Hour: Passing Thoughts On Iran And Its Nuclear Program. Substack. https://substack.com/home/post/p-161626357.
Ewing, G.R. (2025, April 19). Iran nuclear talks to enter ‘next phase’ after negotiations in Rome. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/19/iran-us-nuclear-negotiations-00299713. This comment about caps on the program may refer to Iran’s initial proposal to the U.S. during the first talks to scale down enrichment to 3.67 percent as the first stage of a deal. See Iran proposes three-stage deal to cap enrichment if US lifts sanctions. (2025, April 15). Iran international. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202504172676.
Fassihi, F., Sanger, D.E., & Swan, J. (2025, June 3). U.S. Proposal in Iran Nuclear Talks Allows Some Enrichment. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-proposal.html.
Hafezi, P. (2025, June 2). Exclusive: Iran poised to dismiss US nuclear proposal, Iranian diplomat says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-poised-dismiss-us-nuclear-proposal-says-iranian-diplomat-2025-06-02/.
Freiberg, N. (2025, June 22). Vance: US decision to strike Iranian nuclear sites stemmed from its own intel. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/vance-us-decision-to-strike-iranian-nuclear-sites-stemmed-from-its-own-intel/.